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Introduction


Brexit presents an immense challenge to the UK constitution. The delivery of the UK’s exit from the EU is an undertaking of near unprecedented scale and extent. The initial withdrawal was also to be delivered in an almost unbelievably brief two-year period of time.​[1]​ This has tested and will continue to test the institutions of the UK constitution to (and perhaps well beyond) their limits—Brexit requires governmental activity at a number of levels simultaneously, with decisions reached (or not reached) at each level having the potential to impact significantly on other strands of activity. We see negotiations at the European level shaping legislative and policy activity at the UK level, with decisions also subject to internal negotiations between the UK government and the devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and (when constituted) Northern Ireland, between the government and opposition parties, within the governing parties, and indeed within the Cabinet. Judicial actors intervened early in the process in the high-profile case of Miller,​[2]​ and may yet have a further impact at the end of the process, through the possibility created by the Wightman reference.​[3]​ The electorate took the decision to exit the EU, and, while it remains a remote possibility, they could yet be asked to confirm or reconsider it directly.
Yet Brexit is not just a critical (ongoing) constitutional case study because of the scale and complexity of separating the UK’s legal system from that of the EU, and preparing for the reacquisition of competences which previously have been pooled with the remaining 27 Member States. It raises questions about constitutional capacity, but also about constitutional principles. The decision to exit the EU was also ostensibly driven (at least in part) by constitutional concerns. The ‘Leave’ campaign’s rhetoric that Brexit meant ‘taking back control’ was rolled up with claims about the UK’s loss of law-making authority and the diminution of sovereignty. This confused constitutional narrative, fuelled by fundamental misunderstandings and conflations of different kinds of sovereignty and power, coupled with unrealistic expectations about the influence of a single nation state on the European and international stage, still shapes the UK government’s response to Brexit.​[4]​ The caricature of unfettered authority at home and abroad which underpins such a vision of the UK constitution quite clearly deviates from constitutional reality. However, there was also a sense at the highest levels of Theresa May’s government that this did not really matter—the meaning of Brexit was defined in circular terms, and it has become an end in itself.​[5]​
These challenges of constitutional capacity and principle raise important questions about the state of constitutional democracy in the UK. The way Brexit is delivered and the way in which it is understood will have a major impact on the UK’s constitution, but also on the ways in which key elements of the UK constitution correspond to ideas of democracy. There is no straightforward way to assess this, however, because the UK’s democratic constitution is structurally atypical, and based on a relationship between democracy and the constitution which is fluid rather than fixed. The UK’s democratic system is not based on a legally fundamental set of constitutional norms, established in an overarching text and enforced by a supreme court. Instead, the UK’s democratic arrangements are the product of an uncodified constitution, based on a range of interacting legal and political norms, competing sources of institutional power, and ultimately subject to definition and redefinition through the legislation of a sovereign Parliament.​[6]​ In the UK, the development of democracy legitimised pre-existing constitutional arrangements,​[7]​ and those constitutional structures, including Parliament and the Crown, have not just been adapted to accommodate democracy, but—at least as a matter of principle—now exist subject to the ordinary democratic will of the electorate. In that sense, the UK’s contemporary constitution is both the product of and contingent on democratic politics, rather than a normative vessel which constrains the political system.
The UK’s approach to constitutional democracy therefore produces a high flexible polity, albeit one which nevertheless has, in practice, some deeply embedded fundamental ideas and institutions. Yet when the constitution is not hierarchically superior to democracy, questions of process are not preordained, but resolved (or at least confronted) in response to democratic events. In such circumstances, and especially when faced with an extraordinary political challenge like Brexit, even core ideas become susceptible to revision and displacement. And it is from this perspective—aware of the complex relationship between the UK’s constitution, its politics and its approach to democracy—that we must explore the particular challenge which Brexit poses, and the broader potential consequences of this dramatic reorganisation of the UK political system.
This chapter will review a range of the domestic difficulties which have been encountered in delivering Brexit, and which have challenged the constitution, democracy, and the very idea of constitutional democracy in the UK. The chapter will explore challenges relating to, first, the activities of the UK Parliament and government; second, the position of the devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; and, third, the role of the courts. It will argue that the combined effect of these overlapping, interacting and proliferating challenges has been to place the UK in a period of constitutional overload. One significant consequence of the UK’s constitutional overload is that it raises potential democratic difficulties, both in terms of ensuring the adequate functioning of democracy in the present, as well as with respect to the possibilities for reform of the democratic political system in the future. In the present, constitutional overload means that contemporary democratic tensions are more challenging to resolve. And for the future, constitutional overload means that ways of enhancing democratic practice are even more difficult to identify and implement. In that sense, constitutional overload is one of the biggest challenges to democracy faced by the UK.

The Challenges of Brexit

Brexit has tested the UK’s constitutional democracy in a range of ways. There have been (ongoing) debates about the status and implications of the 2016 referendum decision, the legislative role of Parliament in commencing, implementing and concluding the UK’s withdrawal, the extent to which the government has been subject to adequate accountability during the exit negotiations, the input and consent of the devolved institutions, and the role of the courts in determining questions of process. A crucial common theme of these debates has been clashing ideas of democracy, and how the constitution should respond to or manage these democratic tensions. This section will consider some of the key events of the Brexit process to this point, and explore the competing ideas of democracy which underpin the controversies associated with these events. First, we consider the activities of the UK Parliament and government, second, the role of the devolved institutions, and third, the involvement of the courts.

Parliament and the Government

The UK Parliament and government have been the domestic institutions at the centre of the Brexit process. The government has conducted the exit negotiations with the EU Commission’s negotiating Task Force, while Parliament has been faced with the challenge of legislating for EU withdrawal. If a deal is agreed and a withdrawal treaty is ratified, Parliament will have enacted a trilogy of withdrawal legislation by the time the UK exits the EU. First, the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 was the formal (and sparse) legislative act which authorised the Prime Minister to ‘trigger’ the official exit process set out under Article 50 TEU. Second, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 was a far more elaborate legislative exercise, establishing powers and structures to prepare the UK’s legal system for the widespread consequences of removing the domestic authority of norms derived from EU law. Third, the government has committed to introduce a European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill in order to implement the provisions of an exit treaty in UK law.​[8]​
	The negotiations and the legislative withdrawal trilogy have monopolised the domestic political agenda, and raised an extraordinary range and volume of constitutional questions. Yet what is perhaps most notable is that all this energy has been expended in pursuit of an outcome which does not have majority support in Parliament, and to which the Prime Minister in office during this process was originally opposed. Instead, the institutions of representative democracy have been dominated by their attempts to deliver a decision taken (at least initially) by a different entity: the electorate in the June 2016 referendum. Of course, the decision to pass direct responsibility for the UK’s choice on EU membership was made by the government led by the then Prime Minister David Cameron, and was given effect by Parliament’s legislation in the form of the European Union Referendum Act 2015. But uncertainty as to the status of the 2016 referendum result, in formal constitutional terms, has loomed over the entire Brexit process, and the difficulty experienced by the UK’s regular representative institutions in responding to the sudden, irregular authority of the direct democratic vote has been evident in this context, and elsewhere.
	The referendum has played a crucial role in shaping the interactions between Parliament and the government throughout the Brexit process. The government of Theresa May has tried to adopt the mandate of the referendum and absorb legitimacy for its decision-making from the fact it is focused on delivering the outcome of that popular vote. This became essential because the Prime Minister lost her majority at the snap general election she called in June 2017, which produced a hung Parliament and a weak minority government.​[9]​ That this minority Conservative government is bolstered in power through a ‘confidence and supply’ agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) from Northern Ireland has had implications for the Brexit process more broadly.​[10]​ It has arguably compelled the UK government to give greater priority to the views of one (particularly Eurosceptic) party within Northern Ireland, at a time when there is no devolved government in place in that nation, than it has to the views of other constitutional actors with stronger claims of democratic representativeness. For example, the other devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales have consistently complained about being left on the outside of the Brexit process by the UK government,​[11]​ and the official Opposition can claim to represent a far greater section of the population than the DUP. Of course, in a parliamentary system a government will inevitably do whatever it deems necessary to obtain and sustain the confidence of the House of Commons—but this demonstrates even further the precarious position of Theresa May’s government following the 2017 election failure, and the consequent need to lean heavily on the referendum result as a source of democratic authority.
	The referendum decision is a further democratic input complicating a relationship between Parliament and the government which is already structured by different democratic characteristics. The government exists to deliver on the manifesto commitments it has made to the electorate to obtain office, whereas within Parliament, the House of Commons operates to represent a much wider spectrum of public opinions, while holding ministers and officials to account as they pursue policy goals.​[12]​ The relationship between Parliament and the government is therefore inherently interactive, with the nature of those interactions and the boundaries between different areas of institutional activity subject to ongoing negotiation.​[13]​ The Brexit process has proved an especially acute test of this process of constitutional interaction and negotiation, with a number of key pressure points.
	First, after the Supreme Court had decided that a new Act of Parliament was required to give the Prime Minister authority to give notice of the UK’s withdrawal in accordance with Article 50 TEU, there was extensive debate over whether this power ought to be made subject to specific statutory conditions or qualifications. After the Bill passed the Commons, two particular amendments were made in the House of Lords, defeating the government in both cases. The first sought to protect the rights of EU citizens living in the UK, requiring the government to develop plans to ensure unilateral continuity of EU-derived rights;​[14]​ the second sought to make the UK’s final exit from the EU (whether with or without a deal) subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament.​[15]​ Both were rejected as seeking to tie the hands of the government and frustrate the result of the referendum,​[16]​ and overturned when the Bill returned to the Commons. The Act was ultimately passed without amendment, and in its sole substantive section, conferred an unqualified power on the Prime Minister to notify the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU.​[17]​ But the controversy over the terms of notification also gave a clear indication of what was to follow in future legislative contests, with Parliament trying to establish statutory guarantees of legal continuity, the protection of specific values and, perhaps most significantly in constitutional terms, seeking to use legislation to expand and formalise its own role in the Brexit process. The approach of the government, in contrast, was to try to resist parliamentary attempts to alter the terms of withdrawal legislation, and instead offer ministerial commitments made in the legislature (indeed often during the course of the legislative process) as to, for example, the preservation of the rights of EU citizens, and the role of Parliament in approving a Brexit deal.
	A second major controversy concerned the extent to which legislative power could be delegated to the executive to carry out the detailed changes to domestic legal regulation necessary to produce a functioning statute book after exiting the EU. Following the UK’s notification under Article 50 on 29 March 2017 (just 13 days after the EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 became law upon receiving royal assent), the challenge of preparing the UK legal system for the domestic legal consequences of the withdrawal of EU norms became the main focus of legislative activity. The ludicrous rhetoric of the Prime Minister’s promised ‘Great Repeal Bill’ did not survive contact with legislative reality,​[18]​ and instead the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill was introduced to Parliament. While one of the principal purposes of this legislation was to repeal the European Communities Act 1972, it also sought to establish a system based on the retention of EU legal rules. In pursuit of legal continuity and certainty on exit day, existing norms would be retained in the UK legal system, subject to modifications made by secondary legislation to address any ‘deficiencies’ affecting the operation of retained EU law.​[19]​
The scope of the legislative powers to rewrite the law so far as ministers deem it ‘appropriate’ to remedy deficiencies, which may (for example) arise as reciprocal arrangements are undone, EU functions are removed, or legal rules become redundant, have been hotly contested. While these very extensive delegated legislative powers have been criticised as going beyond what is necessary,​[20]​ the scale of the legislative change required in a short space of time made it inevitable that the government, rather than Parliament, would carry out the core of the detailed work in drafting an estimated 800–1,000 statutory instruments.​[21]​ And while there were some concessions made by the government in terms of the scope of the powers—for example, shifting from an indicative list of potential deficiencies to an exhaustive (although amendable) list of the circumstances in which these powers could be exercised​[22]​—the major change was to accept a reinforced scrutiny process relating to the use of these still very broadly framed powers.​[23]​ This saw a European Statutory Instruments Committee established in the House of Commons (working alongside an equivalent committee in the Lords),​[24]​ with powers to make recommendations (but not binding decisions) about whether it was appropriate for draft delegated legislation to come into force via a negative procedure, subject only to annulment by Parliament, or whether a measure was of a legal or political significance such that the positive affirmation of Parliament was necessary for it to become law. These new processes should allow the legislature more effectively to flag up controversial uses of power for further attention, although they remain limited in so far as the Committee cannot impose its decision on the government, and the vast amount of delegated legislation to be enacted within a short period of time may itself represent a barrier to detailed scrutiny, whether Parliament is required to approve it affirmatively or not.​[25]​ The scrutiny processes have also themselves been the subject of controversy: the government attempted to retreat from a commitment to make a written ministerial statement to explain and publicly justify any decision to reject a scrutiny recommendation, and only reverted to that original position after public criticism from the Procedure Committee of the House of Commons.​[26]​
Third, there has been considerable debate about the role of Parliament in approving any final Brexit deal. As discussed above, arguments about how to ensure Parliament has a ‘meaningful vote’ on the terms of EU withdrawal began in relation to the EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017. This continued in relation to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, and ultimately this legislation was amended in two ways which incorporated government commitments about the role of Parliament in the Brexit process into statute, while also fleshing out the terms and timing of parliamentary involvement. First, the government was defeated on a Commons amendment which made the use by ministers of legislative powers to implement a withdrawal agreement ‘subject to the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU’.​[27]​ Second, a specific section was inserted formalising Parliament’s role in relation to the outcome of negotiations with the EU, preventing ratification of a withdrawal treaty by the government unless the legislature has approved it (and also a statement on a future UK–EU relationship), and also designating specific dates at which the government must report to Parliament on progress if no deal has yet been reached.​[28]​
These provisions provided a clear structure for parliamentary input, and underpinned a guaranteed opportunity for Parliament—and in particular the House of Commons, which must positively approve a deal before ratification is triggered​[29]​—to influence government decision-making concerning the terms of withdrawal from the EU. Yet they did not give Parliament the final say over Brexit: if the Commons rejected a withdrawal agreement which was presented to it, without some further intervening act or an extension of the negotiations, the UK would have proceeded to exit on a ‘no deal’ basis on 29 March 2019. The consequences for a government which saw its withdrawal agreement defeated in the Commons were also unclear—it could have been a precursor to a vote of no confidence and a potential new general election.​[30]​ In practice, however, it was not clear that there was sufficient time for a new domestic election to be held before the original exit day of 29 March, and under the section 13 process, it was  also possible that the current government could be defeated on a Brexit deal, and then sustained in office by Eurosceptic backbenchers in an attempt to ensure that withdrawal occurs even without an agreement in place.​[31]​  This eventuality was realised when the May government failed to obtain approval of the draft Withdrawal Agreement concluded with the EU in three separate votes in the House of Commons, ending in historic defeats on 15 January 2019, 12 March 2019, and 29 March 2019.​[32]​  This led to the further extension of the negotiating process, by agreement between the UK government and the EU 27, first to 12 April 2019, and then to 31 October 2019.​[33]​
We have also seen the government attempt to leverage this formalised structure to its own advantage, arguing that the legal status of this requirement creates a need for clarity about the Commons approval of the deal.​[34]​ Such arguments in favour of eliminating ambiguity also conveniently served to narrow the scope for political manoeuvring in relation to the meaningful vote by the government’s opponents, potentially restricting opportunities for Parliament to challenge the government’s deal by amending an approval motion to give conditional rather than unqualified support.​[35]​ Whether any eventual approval of a deal could yet be made subject to the potential show-stopper of a further referendum on the terms of the deal (although again, it seems difficult to imagine how time would be found for this to occur before even the modified exit day), or a more modest attempt to extract further substantive concessions from the government, we can see that fixing Parliament’s involvement in statutory rules can be disabling, as well as enabling, of the legislature. The last minute decision of the Prime Minister to delay the first ‘meaningful vote’ from the announced date of 11 December 2018 to the week beginning 14 January 2019 also revealed a gap in the legislative rules determining Parliament’s role: there was no direct legal trigger for parliamentary involvement where there was an agreement in principle with the EU, but the government decided to circumvent a vote in an ultimately failed bid to avoid a monumental defeat. As such, while the government adopted ‘the spirit’ of the legislation by then committing to a vote before 21 January 2019 (which wasthe statutory deadline applicable in circumstances where no deal has been agreed),​[36]​ this was a consequence of intense political pressure reshaping the application of the relevant legal rules.
If a withdrawal agreement is ever approved and ratified in the UK, the government has committed to introduce implementing primary legislation both to the EU negotiators​[37]​ and, as seen above, in domestic legislation. Within this context, a further commitment has been made by the government—that this legislation will provide enhanced protection for the rights of EU citizens, preventing Parliament from altering these rights unless it also satisfies some ‘additional procedural step’.​[38]​ This raises challenging constitutional questions about the ability of Parliament to deliver what the government has promised. If Parliament is thought to be incapable of enacting legislation which ‘binds its successors’, this additional protection may be impossible to guarantee as a matter of law.​[39]​ Alternatively, to enact such an explicit limit may be a further step towards confirmation that the orthodox understanding of parliamentary sovereignty has now shifted in the UK, and that the legislature is permitted to exercise its legally unlimited legislative sovereignty to alter the future law-making process.​[40]​ This ‘manner and form’ theory of parliamentary sovereignty would allow Parliament to enact legislation fulfilling the government’s promise—yet it is also far from clear exactly what kind of procedural protection the government intends this legislation to offer. The government has drawn a comparison between this ‘additional procedural step’ and the referendum locks established (but never triggered) in the European Union Act 2011.​[41]​ Yet such a comparison is surely inappropriate in this context, at least if it represents anything more than a hasty example to show the provenance and therefore the possibility of such statutory changes to the future legislative manner and form. Exactly what form the promised procedural protection might take therefore remains to be seen, but to privilege the rights of a particular group in this way might be challenged if this legislation makes it to Parliament. Whether such objections instrumentalise traditional constitutional arguments about the impossibility of binding successors or not, the government’s attempt to foster good faith in the negotiations and reassure a vulnerable group of citizens in a time of major upheaval could yet prove controversial. And even if enacted, the possibility that future governments might seek to subvert any new procedural limits and undo aspects of the exit deal is just one example which demonstrates that the complex constitutional legacy of Brexit could linger well into the future.
There are many further examples which might also be considered, and which test the constitutional relationship between Parliament and the government in the context of Brexit. Among others, there have been debates about the way in which significant political values can be protected in law after Brexit, with Parliament legislating to impose specific obligations on the government in relation to environmental principles​[42]​ and equality issues.​[43]​ Moreover, the central examples of major constitutional legislation which have been discussed here are just part of a broader legislative picture in relation to the UK’s preparations for EU withdrawal, with legislation on Trade, Immigration, Customs and in many other areas also required, often raising further questions about the respective roles of Parliament and the government in these contexts.​[44]​  And ultimately, the intractability of these many issues, along with the power held by Parliament over a minority administration, has already led to the collapse of one government, with Prime Minister Theresa May announcing her resignation on 24 May 2019, due to her continuing failure to obtain the support of the House of Commons for the draft Brexit agreement she had negotiated with the European Union.
Fundamentally, however, the issues considered above provide the most important examples of the ways in which the relationship between Parliament and the government is being challenged by Brexit. This is a challenge underpinned by the limitations of the constitutional capacity of these institutions whether acting separately or in conjunction to respond to a major reorganisation of the UK’s legal and political system. But it is also a challenge underpinned by alternative constitutional principles, and democratic functions. This is not simply a battle for power between the legislature and the executive, but also rooted in tensions between democratic accountability and democratic action. This tension is shaped by the irregular authority of the referendum result, which in some ways stands apart from the authority of the regular political institutions, yet also requires interpretation and implementation by these core constitutional actors. Yet these democratic tensions have not just played out in this specific context—instead, the constitutional complexities generated by Brexit also have clear parallels when we consider the position of the devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Devolution

The relationship between the UK institutions and the devolved governments and legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has also been strained by Brexit. These devolved institutions were created by the UK Parliament,​[45]​ but have a deep constitutional status, such that their permanence has now been recognised in statutes in relation to Scotland​[46]​ and Wales.​[47]​ The authority of these institutions is reinforced by the fact that each of the devolved regimes was created following the positive approval of the respective electorates of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland at national referendums. Yet the competence of each of these institutions is both determined and also limited by Act of Parliament, and as a matter of legal form the devolution scheme is subject to the ultimate sovereignty of the UK Parliament.​[48]​
	Against this backdrop, the process of UK withdrawal from the EU has produced constitutional tensions in a number of areas. First, just as the initial 2016 referendum has complicated the relationship between the UK government and Parliament, so has it complicated the relationship between the UK and the devolved institutions. In particular, we see the clear emergence of different sites of democratic activity which are attempting to pull in entirely different directions. This was evident in the result of the referendum itself, with the electorates of England and Wales voting to leave the EU, and those of Scotland and Northern Ireland voting to remain. However, there was no statutory requirement that majority support was required within each of the four nations for Brexit to proceed, and instead a simple majority across the entire UK electorate was taken to be decisive. The split between the UK’s four nations has nevertheless been significant in terms of the interpretation and delivery of the referendum result.
The Scottish government has offered the most effective opposition to the UK government, arguing for a close relationship with the EU based on continued membership of the single market and customs union on the basis that the people of Scotland voted to support the status quo.​[49]​ This has been in marked contrast to the absence of an institutional voice for Northern Ireland, which for domestic political reasons has been without a government since January 2017.​[50]​ The power-sharing arrangements according to which government is formed in Northern Ireland might have made it difficult for a common position to be adopted in any event. Yet the lack of an established forum in which such debates could occur and key issues could be raised has been especially regrettable given the border with the Republic of Ireland is the only land border between the UK and the EU, and avoiding the creation of new barriers there has been a crucial (and highly disputed) political objective of the withdrawal negotiations.​[51]​ The position in Wales has been complicated by the fact that the electorate voted to leave but the Welsh government supported remain, with this the only place where Labour, the main UK opposition party, has been in power during this period. It has been notable that we have seen considerable coordinated work between the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales, especially given the former is nationalist and aims to achieve Scottish independence, whereas the latter is unionist. Perhaps as a consequence of that commitment to the union, the Welsh government has also been responsible for some of the more detailed proposals for reinforcing intergovernmental decision-making processes after Brexit, including suggesting the creation of a new UK Council of Ministers.​[52]​
A second related area of tension concerns not just the interplay between different democratic actors with varying mandates and alternative visions for Brexit, but the extent to which the consent of the devolved institutions is formally required for the plans the UK government is intent on delivering. Under the terms of the UK’s devolution arrangements, the consent of the devolved institutions is dealt with as a matter of constitutional convention, rather than as a matter of law. The so-called Sewel convention requires devolved consent for any UK legislation which falls within an area of devolved competence,​[53]​ or where legislation would alter the powers of a devolved institution.​[54]​ The question of devolved consent to Brexit has emerged in two contexts: first, in relation to the UK’s notification of its intention to withdraw from the EU under Article 50; and second, in relation to the domestic legislative plans to prepare the UK legal system for Brexit. In relation to notification of withdrawal, the UK government argued that it was responsible for decisions concerning EU membership, and devolved consent was not required. This position was challenged as one aspect of the Miller litigation, which ultimately reached the UK Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously held that there was no consent requirement which it could enforce: ‘Judges … are neither the parents nor the guardians of political conventions; they are merely observers. As such … they cannot give legal rulings on its operation or scope, because those matters are determined within the political world’.​[55]​
There is a clear contrast, however, between the position with respect to consent to notification and consent to the domestic legal preparations for Brexit. The EU (Withdrawal) Bill obviously engaged consent requirements as a matter of constitutional convention because (among other things) it would inevitably need to remove the explicit statutory limitation preventing the devolved legislatures from legislating in contravention of EU law. Yet ultimately, for the UK government, compliance with this constitutional convention was taken to be a dispensable aspiration, rather than a democratic fundamental. Agreement on the terms of the legislation could not be reached with the Scottish government, which viewed the UK government as undermining devolved competence by seeking initially to allocate control over all policy areas previously dealt with under EU law to the UK Parliament, even where such powers would otherwise relate to devolved matters. Consequently, a legislative consent motion was not passed in the Scottish Parliament.​[56]​ The Welsh government, in contrast, did accept the concessions made by the UK government, and the National Assembly for Wales gave consent to what was enacted as the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018.​[57]​
While obtaining consent from Wales provides some political cover for the UK government, to proceed without the agreement of Scotland in such significant, delicate and contested constitutional circumstances is without precedent, and presents a challenge to the democratic principles underpinning the devolution system at exactly the moment that Brexit will require greater collaboration between the four nations. Indeed, the approach of the UK government to the development of the UK-wide regulatory frameworks which will need to be constructed to replace the overarching norms of EU law will now be crucial. The UK government refused to accede to the Scottish request to establish legal vetoes in the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 to prevent common frameworks being imposed on the devolved nations, on subject matters including the environment, agriculture, food labelling, chemicals regulation, public procurement, public health and aspects of cross-border justice.​[58]​ Instead, these common frameworks will be subject to a parallel presumption to the Sewel convention: that they will not normally be established without the consent of the devolved institutions.​[59]​ In that sense, the failure to receive consent for the overall approach to establishing common frameworks means it is absolutely essential that the UK government respects this commitment at a more granular level, and ensures that no specific UK-wide regulatory arrangements are imposed without devolved consent, at least if this scheme is to respect the democratic character of devolution.
These competing democratic claims and mandates, and the different interpretations of ideas of consent and power distribution which they generate, are likely to continue to shape the direction of devolution in the UK after Brexit. It is important to note the genuinely constitutional character of these challenges, and the way in which these objections transcend the purely political. The status of the devolved institutions and their democratic credentials gives additional authority to them as objectors to central government decision-making, and added weight to their substantive objections. Even if in a number of instances the views of the devolved institutions have not prevailed, they have played a key role in shaping national debates, in contrast to less constitutionally conspicuous constituencies, such as the northern English regions. In this sense, Brexit has shown us the potential of devolution not just as a constitutional scheme for exercising power, but as a scheme of constitutional opposition.
If one of the jobs of the UK constitution is to manage, or even resolve, these internal differences with as few ruptures as possible, it has been found lacking. Yet the present mixed record might conceal ever greater challenges ahead. The mishandling of the input of the devolved institutions into the Brexit process has the potential to reintensify debates about the future of the union itself. There are no immediate plans for a second Scottish independence referendum, or a border poll on the reunification of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. However, the prospect of any such reassessment of popular consent to the UK as a national project only grows more likely if the varying democratic components of the constitution are not better accommodated in the post-Brexit domestic union. What form such accommodation might take is difficult to predict, although for some a federalisation of the UK constitution seems the inevitable trajectory.​[60]​ Yet this would also raise democratic questions, particularly as regards the further empowerment of the judiciary it might precipitate. The inflated constitutional prominence of the judiciary has already been a key feature of the domestic response to Brexit, and highlights the extent to which litigation has been used, with varying results, as a tool to structure, and potentially also to disrupt, this political process.

The Judiciary

In a system which is classically regarded as a ‘political constitution’,​[61]​ the judiciary can generally be understood to have a subsidiary constitutional role in the UK. The fundamental constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty establishes a legislative power for the UK Parliament which is not subject to legal limits, and therefore confirms the basic priority of the processes of political accountability over those of legal accountability.​[62]​ This standard position has been subject to change in the modern period. The powers flowing to the courts as a consequence of the UK’s membership of the EU, and in particular the need to ‘disapply’ even domestic primary legislation which violates EU law, has been a key element of this process.​[63]​ Yet this has not been the only context in which the domestic courts have been empowered: the Human Rights Act 1998 creates a scheme in which all primary legislation is subject to substantive judicial review to assess its compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights;​[64]​ the devolution system gives the courts the task of ensuring that devolved primary legislation is within competence, and the responsibility for invalidating anything which exceeds that; and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 created a new UK Supreme Court providing an infrastructure for growing institutional self-confidence. The UK Parliament has obviously been the key actor empowering the courts through its legislative activity, but the Brexit process has demonstrated that this extension of judicial authority is altering the constitutional position of the courts, in uncertain ways.
	First, we have seen the courts drawn into debates concerning the consequences of democratic decision-making and the authority of democratic institutions at the UK level. This is particularly challenging territory for the judges, given the obviously non-democratic character of the UK’s judicial institutions in general, but especially when combined more specifically with the intensely contested political environment which has developed around the 2016 referendum. In this context, determination of the domestic constitutional requirements to even begin the process of negotiating withdrawal under Article 50 TEU became a major public debate, with the courts at its centre. It was ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court returning the issue to Parliament in Miller, the majority judgment having concluded that there was a legal necessity for fresh legislative authorisation to give notification of EU withdrawal. This decision had a limited substantive impact, given the quick response from Parliament to fill the gap in authority discerned by the Supreme Court,​[65]​ but Miller nevertheless raises important questions about the constitutional position of the courts. Following hysterical criticism of the initial judgment of the High Court in Miller, with the judges described in some parts of the media as ‘enemies of the people’ supporting an attempt to frustrate the will of the people, the Supreme Court relied on a sharp distinction between law and politics to justify its jurisdiction:
[T]his case has nothing to do with issues such as the wisdom of the decision to withdraw from the European Union ... Those are all political issues which are matters for ministers and Parliament to resolve. They are not issues which are appropriate for resolution by judges, whose duty is to decide issues of law which are brought before them … in a democratic society.​[66]​	
The Supreme Court in Miller therefore positioned itself as the arbiter of matters of pure law, and the majority paid little attention to the result or authority of the referendum, attempting to frame this instead as a narrow question about the legal powers of the government. Yet this was problematic in two ways. First, the judgment of the majority in the Supreme Court was explicitly based on an analysis of the constitutional context, concerning the significance of the removal of EU law as a source of the UK’s legal system. Indeed, perhaps the central justification for the majority’s decision was that ‘it would be inconsistent with long-standing and fundamental principle for such a far-reaching change to the UK constitutional arrangements to be brought about by ministerial decision or ministerial action alone’.​[67]​ These ‘long-standing and fundamental’ principles were not identified or articulated, making the judgment seem more like an assessment of constitutional morality than an exercise in objective legal reasoning. The second problem was that this consequentialist constitutional approach of the majority was selective. To insist on legislative authorisation at the start of the Brexit process overlooked the deep and complex set of interactions that would necessarily occur between Parliament and the government throughout the process of EU withdrawal, and as noted by Lord Carnwath in dissent, failed to take proper account of another ‘fundamental’ principle, that of ‘Parliamentary accountability’.​[68]​ The decision in Miller might therefore be criticised as taking a very broad view of the legal constitutional context, and the monumental consequences of removing EU rules as a source of domestic law, but showing little interest in the political constitutional context, and in particular the interactive relationship between Parliament and the government which would necessarily underpin the Brexit process.
	In a sense, Miller might therefore be seen to represent a judicialisation of the domestic constitutional process of withdrawal, with law ultimately conceived as a constraint on political actors, rather than a tool through which political ends (whether good or bad) are achieved. This is not to say a simplistic distinction can be drawn between law as a limit or as an enabler, or that the government should be able to act unbound by legal rules. Instead, it is to highlight the fact that the Supreme Court has played a significant role in definitively establishing the terms of what is a political process, in a political constitution, and that very little attention has been given to the appropriateness of such crucial decisions being made by the judiciary. That we should have respect for the idea of the rule of law does not provide an adequate answer to this problem, for the very dilemma here is why such matters should be characterised as questions of law, rather than questions requiring political resolution. This confidence that there can be legal solutions to political problems has had broader consequences—we have seen a flurry of other litigation relating to Brexit, much of it futile, but still serving to propagate the notion that legal challenge is a means not just to clarify but also to obstruct the political process.​[69]​ At a time of considerable constitutional uncertainty, this means we also have additional uncertainty about the position of the courts, and questions to ask about the scope of their role in a democratic political system.
	Second, the courts have also been drawn into a dispute settlement role between the UK and the devolved institutions in the context of Brexit. Again, this puts the judiciary in a delicate position, in having to navigate a legal framework which sometimes struggles to neatly accommodate the competing democratic claims of actors in different constitutional layers. The difficulty of this role was also made evident in Miller, with the Supreme Court unanimously deciding that it would not enforce the Sewel convention, which could have established a legally actionable right for the devolved institutions to consent to—or more importantly, to veto—the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. This has attracted criticism on the ground that the Supreme Court failed to give legal effect to the Sewel convention despite the fact that this norm is now captured in statute, and is potentially thereby given legal force.​[70]​ The Supreme Court was surely right, however, to decide that through this provision the UK Parliament was simply ‘recognising’ the convention in statute,​[71]​ and ‘not seeking to convert the Sewel Convention into a rule which can be interpreted, let alone enforced, by the courts’.​[72]​ More problematic is that the formalistic approach taken by the Court to this issue stands in stark contrast to the far more elaborate constitutional reasoning justifying the need for the approval of the UK Parliament. The Miller decision is therefore left open to objections of selective engagement with principle, and an approach to consequentialist analysis that favoured the UK, but not the devolved, institutions. Indeed, this could be seen as evidence of a strategic approach by the Supreme Court—the risk of the UK Parliament halting a process it had started by passing the EU Referendum Act 2015 was very low, and to require its approval to begin the Article 50 negotiations was therefore a safe outcome. Whereas the risk of the devolved institutions in Scotland and Northern Ireland refusing consent to a Brexit which failed to attract majority support in these nations was much higher, and therefore a controversial outcome which the courts would be keen to avoid.
	Whether the UK Supreme Court is seen as a fair dealer by the devolved institutions into the future may also be shaped by its decision in a second case, which was entirely premised on a disagreement between the Scottish and the UK legislatures. Following the UK government’s controversial decision to seek initially to centralise powers returning from the EU which would otherwise naturally fall within areas of devolved competence, and the Scottish Parliament’s refusal to consent to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill as a result, competing EU Continuity legislation was been passed in Scotland.​[73]​ This Bill was modelled on the UK Withdrawal legislation, but with some significant differences, in terms of substance (such as the retention of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Scotland) and in terms of process (crucially giving the Scottish government co-decision-making powers in relation to subject matters returning from the EU and falling within existing areas of devolved competence).​[74]​ Once passed, but before legal enactment, the Scottish Bill was referred to the UK Supreme Court to determine whether it was a lawful exercise of devolved competence.​[75]​ This clash of legislation left the Supreme Court in a precarious position. If it ruled against the Scottish Bill, the extent to which it is the UK’s Supreme Court would never have been more apparent. Yet if the Court decided that the devolved Continuity legislation was legally valid, this would have produced the incredible complexity of related but distinct regimes governing EU withdrawal in different nations of the UK, underpinned by different values, and potentially competing attitudes to the question of regulatory change or alignment.  The Supreme Court ultimately held that the Scottish Bill was, in large part, outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament because the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, once finally enacted, had through its own terms been itself designated as a ‘protected provision’ in the terms of the devolution settlement.​[76]​  The Scottish Parliament was therefore not permitted to modify the effects of the UK Withdrawal Act, or indeed other protected provisions, including section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998, which preserves the power of the UK Parliament to legislate for Scotland.  As a result, the Continuity Bill was eventually abandoned by the Scottish Government.​[77]​  The Supreme Court’s rather surprising decision to emphasise the continuing sovereignty of the UK Parliament explicitly throughout the judgment suggests that any of the flexibility which the judges are increasingly attempting to develop around that constitutional principle is unlikely to be used to enhance the standing of the devolved institutions.​[78]​  In that sense, the Supreme Court does not appear to be a forum in which more ambitious arguments based on the constitutional values underpinning devolution will be capable of transcending the legal architecture of those arrangements.
	A final complexity in the context of devolution is that, the UK Supreme Court in Miller having avoided any attempts to make a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as to the possibility of an Article 50 notification being lawfully revoked, the Scottish courts have made such a reference to the European court. This case was brought by a group of politicians, including Members of the Scottish, UK and European Parliaments. They argued that having a clear answer as a matter of EU law as to the legality of the UK government unilaterally withdrawing its exit notice would be essential to their ability to discharge their duties as parliamentarians, by understanding the full range of possibilities when asked to vote to approve any deal which might be agreed between the EU and UK government. This petition was rejected by the Outer House of the Court of Session, but accepted on appeal to the Inner House. Whereas Lord Boyd in the Outer House thought this case related to a hypothetical issue, rather than any concrete legal dispute, and to make such a reference amounted to an attempt to influence the parliamentary process,​[79]​ the Inner House held there would be no interference with parliamentary privilege in making a reference, because to obtain legal clarity would not compel members of the legislature to reach any particular decision.​[80]​ A UK government appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected on technical grounds,​[81]​ and so the CJEU decided the matter, concluding that the unilateral revocation of the Article 50 notice would be lawful, if it was ‘unequivocal’, ‘unconditional’, and ‘brings the withdrawal procedure to an end’.​[82]​ Whether this will be material is unclear, given Theresa May’s government consistently indicated it would not consider withdrawing the notice in any event. Whether this is likely to be advantageous for the litigants is also unclear—given the legal conditions now attached to revocation of notice, there may be less room for manoeuvre in extreme circumstances than had the matter been left open to resolution through the supranational political process. But from the perspective of the domestic courts, making this reference is to accept that it is legitimate for the legal process to be used to shape parliamentary decision-making. Indeed, this is the very aim of the petitioners who are political actors. And in that sense, the decision to make a reference to the CJEU can, at the very least, be seen as an indirect interference with Parliament’s democratic privilege to make decisions without the range of possibilities having been pre-emptively established in the courts.
	The Brexit process therefore shows the courts drawn into a complex democratic arena, resolving disputes linked to competing democratic actors, barely concealed beneath a veneer of legality. We can see the acute difficulty in principle, and the implausibility in practice, of the judiciary purporting to take an objective legal approach in this context. That is not to say the courts are making decisions based on the first order political preferences of judges, but that they are arguably insensitive to the varying democratic ideas in play and in competition. In this sense, the idea that the rule of law stands above and apart from democratic decision-making is exposed as simply another conception of democratic government, one in which democratic activity is characterised as occurring in specific areas tightly constrained by a framework of law, rather than viewing democracy as a value which pervades and structures the entire political system. Such a formalistic approach to the relationship between law and democracy might be justifiable if it had been deployed consistently, yet in fact the courts have occupied a prominent position in the Brexit process, often establishing a more active constitutional role for themselves through their reasoning (especially in Miller) and their decisions (especially in Wightman). This new role sits uneasily with the UK’s tradition of constitutional democracy, with the courts using constitutional ideas to establish and impose procedural requirements, rather than leaving the constitution to be shaped by democratic contestation through democratic processes. It is far from clear that the courts are institutionally or democratically suited for a role as constitutional author. And at the very least, there needs to be much better articulation of those norms which operate to constrain the engagement of the courts with sensitive political questions, as much as those principles which permit such judicial activity.

Constitutional Overload and Constitutional Democracy

How do we begin to analyse the overall effects of this (still ongoing) series of constitutional episodes? In terms of constitutional capacity, the UK’s constitution is obviously straining under the weight of delivering change of this complexity, in this volume. And from the perspective of constitutional principle, the extent of the complexity stems not merely from the regular (and necessary) democratic competition between proponents of alternative outcomes, but from clashes generated by competing institutional conceptions of constitutional democracy itself. It may be a source of some irony that in a constitution especially associated (rightly or wrongly) with the facilitation of power, perhaps the overarching and continuing deficiencies of the UK’s institutions of government have been chronic indecision and a failure (or inability) to plot a clear future trajectory. As a result, the UK’s political constitution risks being overwhelmed by its politics.​[83]​
However, when attempting to assess the impact of the Brexit process, our analysis must be more sophisticated than simply blaming all problems on the failings of the UK constitution, perhaps because of its unorthodox structure, or its emphasis, through the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, on the constitutional supremacy of political processes rather than legal principles. This is far from an easy story of democratic disintegration or constitutional collapse. Instead, we need to try to draw out the precise nature of the difficulties faced in this period and to better understand their effects. From this perspective, the real challenge of the Brexit process is that it is the product of a combination of factors, based on competing interpretations of institutional power, of democratic will, and of constitutional authority. In essence, during the Brexit process, the UK is in a period of political turmoil, legal uncertainty, and constitutional overload.
What are the key characteristics of this period of constitutional overload? The sheer scale of the challenge of Brexit is the initial starting point, with implications across the whole spectrum of constitutional activity. Yet this constitutional overload is also about more than just the fact that Brexit means there is a vast amount of work to do in a short period of time. Instead, what crucially defines this period of overload is the way in which the various constitutional challenges are interacting, and as a result, intensifying, magnifying and proliferating. We have seen a general tendency towards escalation, with difficulties in one area cutting across into other areas, producing a levelling-up effect in terms of constitutional controversy, with each specific challenge latent with the potential to prompt further difficulties.
For example, we have seen controversial legislative decisions taken by Parliament and the government in the UK create problems in the devolution context, with the Scottish refusal to accept the terms of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which itself has created difficult problems for courts, in the litigation over the Scottish Continuity Bill. Further, we have seen the actions of devolved actors create dilemmas for the UK’s political institutions, with the Scottish and Welsh legislatures reaching different decisions on consent to the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, and the inability to form an executive in Northern Ireland giving a lack of institutional voice to that nation and disproportionate influence to the DUP. We have also seen the Scottish government arguing for equivalent treatment if Northern Ireland obtains a special status remaining in alignment with aspects of the single market, complicating debates over the avoidance of a hard border on the island of Ireland. We have seen the actions of the judiciary creating a no-win situation for the UK Parliament after Miller, with the legislature then required explicitly to authorise notification of withdrawal to respect the referendum result, and therefore becoming constitutionally complicit in the decision, providing the UK government with a basis to repel subsequent parliamentary criticism and scrutiny. Similarly, the courts have profoundly weakened the position of the devolved institutions in Miller, formally confirming the absence of a legal consent requirement, while there is potential for the outcome of the Wightman litigation to place the UK government in a challenging position as regards the possibility of revoking the Article 50 notice. And, indeed, decisions taken by the UK’s electorates have created challenges for all established constitutional actors, not least the result of the 2017 general election which, in creating a hung Parliament, created the perfect political storm of a weak minority government and no obvious majority for any particular outcome to the Brexit negotiations.
The constitutional overload resulting from these interacting and intensifying challenges is also exacerbated because it is framed around clashing ideas of constitutional principle. As we have seen, a defining theme of the Brexit process has been different institutional engagement with different ideas of democracy. We see competition between direct and representative democracy, between rule-bound and transformative conceptions of democracy, and between the wills of different national and subnational democratic peoples. And we see these competing democratic claims propagated and even appropriated by different institutional actors. Constitutional overload is not therefore merely the product of a build-up of different events, problems and activities which intensify in their complexity as they go unsolved, or in relation to which any potential solution seems to generate a new round of problems (with the debate about the ‘backstop’ designed to prevent a hard border emerging between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland being perhaps the most obvious example of such a spiralling solution). Rather, constitutional overload is also a consequence of the apparent irreconcilability of competing democratic claims, and the near irresolvable institutional conflicts erupting to vindicate these claims.​[84]​
Constitutional overload therefore has a dual character. We see clashes of constitutional principle underpinning problems of constitutional capacity in the domestic attempts to respond to Brexit. But as a result, the constitution is not just overloaded in the sense that too much activity is required in a range of distinct areas, but with cross-cutting implications, in a short period of time. The UK constitution is also overloaded in that in this contested democratic environment it cannot establish a singular process for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. There is a range of values, priorities and functions which are all constitutional in their character, and yet pushed, pulled and strained by Brexit to the point that what the norms of UK constitutional democracy require has become impossible to define with certainty. The 2016 referendum has a clear constitutional authority, but Parliament has the right to decide how to implement the result. The government has the power to make decisions concerning the future direction of public policy and the shape of the relationship with the EU, but opposition parties have a duty to scrutinise and challenge. The devolved institutions must protect their competences and represent their electorates, yet the UK institutions have the authority to make decisions for the nation as a whole. The courts have the right to hear cases concerning legal questions associated with the process of withdrawal, but the political institutions are justified in expecting significant deference, and not inference, from non-democratic judicial actors.
In this context, the constitution is overloaded almost to the point where both everything and nothing is simultaneously constitutional.​[85]​ And as a result, everything and nothing seems like it might be possible. This is perhaps most apparent in relation to the consequences of a failure by the House of Commons to approve the draft Withdrawal Agreement negotiated by Theresa May. It might have led to a general election, a change of government, a change of Prime Minister, an attempt to renegotiate with the EU, an extension of the Article 50 negotiating period, a further vote on the draft deal, a second referendum on Brexit, negotiated withdrawal of the exit notice, unilateral withdrawal of the exit notice, or simply a no-deal Brexit. And in the continued absence of parliamentary approval for any single way forward, all of these options will remain on the table.  Even if a degree of unpredictability is inevitable in such unprecedented circumstances, this level of constitutional uncertainty is extreme. Constitutional overload has therefore paradoxically produced both turbulence and stasis in the UK’s legal and political system, and as a result, the challenge of shaping the domestic response to Brexit only grows.
What are the implications of the UK’s current constitutional overload? The tensions emerging between different conceptions of democracy, different democratic claims, different democratic actors and different democratic functions reveal democratic problems for the constitution, both practical and conceptual in nature. Yet these problems will not be easily solved, because of the constitutional overload by which they have been exposed. A lack of constitutional time and capacity presently exists to deal with intensely difficult questions concerning the appropriate future shape and character of the UK’s constitutional democracy, along with a lack of imagination regarding the ways in which that constitution might be redesigned. In a period where there is too much activity, there is a regular flow of distractions from major underlying problems. Everything instantly becomes a constitutional crisis,​[86]​ and so nothing is. The energy and institutional capacity for reform has been diminished at the exact moment the need for reform is being most acutely demonstrated. And in this sense, constitutional overload itself is one of the biggest challenges to democracy faced by the UK.
Does this mean we are destined for democratic torpor in the post-Brexit UK? What awaits the UK’s constitutional system after Brexit very much remains to be seen, but a significant gap might quickly emerge between the reform that could be desirable and the reform that could be possible. In terms of what is desirable, a new internal architecture may become necessary to structure decision-making between the UK and the devolved institutions of government, to organise the use of regained competences and to establish and maintain common frameworks in legal areas where they are agreed (while ensuring they are not centrally imposed). We may need to reassess existing norms regarding how and when referendums are used, while considering additional mechanisms which might allow citizen deliberation and participation to be enhanced. The voting system should be revisited to consider how to reinforce representative institutions at a time when the system is failing to provide either proportionate or stable outcomes. We might attempt to find a better use for the House of Lords when the necessity of breaking the hold of elites over politics has acquired new urgency. Yet a programme of constitutional rethinking incorporating these examples already has an idealistic tenor, and would be liable to disruption by further events extending the period of overload: a further independence referendum will be a high priority for pro-EU forces in Scotland, and a poll on the status of Northern Ireland cannot be ruled out as the impact of any changes to the border with the Republic of Ireland become clearer. And even if the current constitutional overload eventually subsides, this is likely to be followed by a period of constitutional fatigue and avoidance.
The constitutional overload generated by Brexit has therefore revealed flaws in the structures of the UK’s democratic constitution. But even if this does amount to a significant ‘constitutional moment’,​[87]​ it is far from clear that a shift to a more traditional conception of constitutional democracy would provide a solution. While in the dominant liberal account of constitutional democracy we might expect to see the constitutional operating to temper democratic politics, in the UK democratic politics is driving the constitutional. In such circumstances, attempts to more deeply constrain institutional power arguably represent a diversion.​[88]​ The democratic tensions evident in this context are deeply embedded, and were not simply created by the 2016 referendum. The UK’s struggle with Brexit may tell us something about the modern limitations of the nation state, and the extent to which democratic decision-making within it is confined by external factors. This is not to suggest that the nation state is now unviable as the basic unit of governance, but that Brexit may be a lesson in the difficulty—or perhaps futility—of pursuing a strategy of constitutional isolation. If this is the case, Brexit may demonstrate the increased fragility of national authority in the face of globalised power networks. This suggests that the priority should be to strengthen the democratic state to better respond to these developments and agendas, rather than to use constitutionalism to restrain democracy so that the status quo become impossible to challenge.
At this moment, however, Brexit-induced constitutional overload presents a major barrier to more elaborate domestic constitutional reform, at precisely the moment the constitutional events explored in this chapter are making need for systematic change so readily apparent. We clearly need a greater sense of the possibilities if we are to avoid becoming resigned to a democratically inchoate existence, and to have any chance of shaping the UK’s constitutional future. However, it would be complacent to assume the contemporary prominence of constitutional issues provides a steady platform for far-reaching reform; it is perhaps more likely that when constitutional overload subsides, a return to relative normality will be mistaken for a solution to deeper-lying problems. Yet absent some more detailed reflection on the UK’s institutional order, its distribution of power, and its democratic model, it may take a future re-emergence of constitutional overload for us to realise these problems were not solved, but simply submerged.

Conclusion

Brexit has dominated the UK’s politics, unsettled its democracy, and overloaded its constitution. Ultimately, the impact of Brexit on the state of the UK’s democratic constitutional model will not be uniform or easy to predict. While constraints of some variety will inevitably remain, the UK seems set to deviate from the European model of coordination through supranational systems of law. The flow of power away from Westminster within the UK may well accelerate, and the competition between different democratic claims and actors may become even more complex. The brutal practical challenge of Brexit is already highlighting the inadequacy of some aspects of our domestic constitutional arrangements, yet paradoxically it is also sapping energy for deeper reform. The UK’s current period of constitutional overload is distracting us from underlying problems, including the disempowerment of certain regions and the disenchantment of citizens, which the referendum has arguably served to exacerbate. But there are no easy answers, because Brexit demonstrates that the UK is experiencing clashes between what is ‘constitutional’ and what is ‘democratic’. The UK’s model of constitutional democracy may be premised on the idea that there is fluidity in the way that democratic decisions (re)shape the constitution, and the constitution provides space for a range of competing democratic inputs. Yet the interconnected challenges of constitutional capacity and constitutional principle which have been generated by Brexit have pushed the UK into a period of spiralling constitutional overload, and there is no clear resolution in view. The path to an enhanced democratic constitution will require us to emerge from this period of overload and, rather than succumb to fatigue or accept a resumption of the old ways, to reconsider the ideas of democracy which underpin the UK’s legal and political system. At present, however, precisely because this period of constitutional overload is self-sustaining and intensifying, that path seems some way into the distance.
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